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Abstract
Proof-carrying code (PCC) is a technique for downloading mobile code on a host machine while ensuring that the code adheres
to the host’s safety policy. We show how certiﬁed abstract interpretation can be used to build a PCC architecture where the code
producer can produce program certiﬁcates automatically. Code consumers use proof checkers derived from certiﬁed analysers to
check certiﬁcates. Proof checkers carry their own correctness proofs and accepting a new proof checker amounts to type checking
the checker in Coq. Certiﬁcates take the form of strategies for reconstructing a ﬁxpoint and are kept small due to a technique
for ﬁxpoint compression. The PCC architecture has been implemented and evaluated experimentally on a byte code language for
which we have designed an interval analysis that allows to generate certiﬁcates ascertaining that no array-out-of-bounds accesses
will occur.
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1. Introduction
Proof-carrying code (PCC) is a technique for downloading mobile code on a host machine while ensuring that the
code adheres to the host’s safety policy. The basic idea is that the code producer sends the code with a proof (in a
suitably chosen logic) that the code is secure. Upon reception of the code, the code consumer submits the proof to
a proof checker for the logic. Thus, in the basic PCC architecture, the only components that have to be trusted are
the program logic, the proof checker of the logic and the formalisation of the safety property in this logic. Neither
the mobile code nor the proposed safety proof have to be trusted. In his seminal work, Necula [18] axiomatises the
program using a Hoare-like logic. For a given safety policy, this logic comes together with a veriﬁcation condition
generator (VCGen) that generates lemmas, the proofs of which are sufﬁcient to ensure the property. For each lemma,
a machine-checkable proof term has to be generated by the code producer. One weakness of the initial approach is that
the soundness of the veriﬁcation condition generator is not proved but taken for granted, having as a consequence that
“there were errors in that code that escaped the thorough testing of the infrastructure” [21].
The foundational PCC (FPCC) of Appel [2,3] gives stronger semantic foundations to PCC by generating veriﬁcation
conditions directly from the operational semantics rather than from some program logic, but the proofs are accordingly
more complicated to produce. An alternative approach is presented by Nipkow and Wildmoser [26] who prove the
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soundness of a weakest precondition calculus with respect to the byte code semantics for a reasonable subset of Java
byte code. Veriﬁcation conditions are proved using a hybrid approach that use both trusted and untrusted provers. An
example of a trusted prover is the byte code veriﬁer that Klein and Nipkow have formalised and proved correct in Isabelle
[13]. Untrusted provers are external static analysers that suggest potential (inductive) invariants. These invariants are
then reproved inside Isabelle to obtain a transmittable program certiﬁcate.
Abstract interpretation is another technique for proving invariants of programs and Albert et al. have proposed to
use the ﬁxpoint generated by an abstract interpretation as the certiﬁcate. Their analysis-carrying code approach [1] is
a PCC framework for constraint logic programs in which the checker veriﬁes that a proposed certiﬁcate is a ﬁxpoint
of an abstract interpretation of the communicated program. This solves the problem of producing the certiﬁcates
automatically but requires the code consumer to take for granted the semantic correctness of the abstract interpretation.
It is thus prone to the same objections as those made against the initial PCC framework where the code consumer had
to trust the correctness of the veriﬁcation condition generator. In this paper we show how to improve on this situation
by developing a foundational PCC architecture based on certiﬁed abstract interpretation [7] which is a technique for
extracting a static analyser from the constructive proof of its semantic correctness. The technique produces at the same
time an analyser and a proof object certifying its semantic correctness. This proof object can then be communicated to
the code consumer for veriﬁcation. We describe how this leads to an infrastructure that allows to download specialised
proof-checkers carrying their own correctness proof (Section 2). These proof checkers are derived automatically in a
functorial way from a certiﬁed analysis.
An important issue in PCC is that of optimising (i.e., minimising) the size of certiﬁcates. In the context of abstract
interpretation-based PCC, this amounts to the compression of ﬁxpoints, as e.g. it is done in lightweight byte code
veriﬁcation [23,24]. In Sections 5 and 6, we propose a fully automatic ﬁxpoint compression algorithm that generates
compressed certiﬁcates from the results of untrusted static analysers. We have evaluated the feasibility of the approach
and the efﬁciency of the ﬁxpoint compression on the problem of communicating proof that a byte code program will
not perform any illegal array accesses. As part of this experiment we have deﬁned (and certiﬁed) an interval analysis
for byte code that combines the standard interval-based abstract interpretation with a modicum of symbolic evaluation,
resulting in a novel abstract domain of syntactic expressions (Section 4). This extension is required in order to have
a sufﬁciently precise analysis; at the same time it shows that complex analyses are within reach of certiﬁcation and
hence can be used for foundational, abstract interpretation-based PCC.
2. A PCC architecture with certiﬁed proof checkers
In the following, we propose an extensible PCC architecture based on abstract interpretation which allows to download
dedicated, certiﬁed proof-checkers safely. The architecture, summarised in Fig. 1, is bootstrapped by the code consumer
with a general purpose proof checker, here Coq [25]. The certiﬁcation of a program is done using a two-step protocol
between the code producer and the code consumer. In the ﬁrst step, the producer queries the consumer in order to know
whether it possesses the relevant proof-checker. If not, the producer sends the checker together with its soundness proof.
This soundness proof is then veriﬁed automatically by a general-purpose proof checker (here, the Coq type checker)
and if veriﬁcation succeeds, the now certiﬁed checker is installed. In this way, the architecture combines the advantages
of both a trustworthy general-purpose proof checker and ﬂexible specialised proof checkers. Once the proof checker
has been installed, the consumer is ready to download the program of the code producer. As it is customary in PCC,
the code producer sends the program packaged with a certiﬁcate to be checked by the previously downloaded proof
checker. This certiﬁcate can be obtained using optimised, un-trusted ﬁxpoint solvers and compressors since it will be
checked upon reception.
We use the program extraction mechanism of Coq to extract efﬁcient Caml checkers from their Coq speciﬁcation.
Extraction is using the proofs-as-programs paradigm to erase those parts of a proof term that only concerns the proof of
properties and which do not contribute to the speciﬁed computation. A formal account of Coq current extraction can be
found in Letouzey’s thesis [15]. It would, in principle, have been possible to execute the Coq speciﬁcation directly since
the Coq proof-checker implements strong normalisation of lambda terms. However, this mechanism is at the moment
not efﬁcient enough to make such an approach viable (recent progress in the implementation of strong reduction [12]
may change this in the future).
The producer and consumer have to formalise what it means for a program to be safe. This is done by providing a
Coq speciﬁcation of the semantics (here, a small-step operational semantics) of the program together with a semantic
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Fig. 1. PCC architecture.
deﬁnition of the security policy. We restrict our attention to safety properties that must hold for all reachable execution
states. More precisely, the Coq speciﬁcation provides:
• the type of programs Pgm,
• a semantic domain State,
• a set of initial semantic states : S0 ⊆ State,
• for each program, an operational semantics →p⊆ State × State,
• for each program, a set Safep of states that respect the security policy.
As usual, we write →∗p for the reﬂexive transitive closure of the transition relation of the program p. The collecting
semantics of a program p is deﬁned as the set of all states reachable by →p, starting from an element of S0
p =
{
s ∈ State | ∃s0 ∈ S0, s0 →∗p s
}
.
Deﬁnition 2.1. A program p is safe if p ⊆ Safep, i.e., if all its reachable states are safe.
Together with the Coq proof-checker and extraction mechanism, the speciﬁcation of the semantics and safety property
form the trusted computing base (TCB) of the PCC architecture. In Fig. 1, these trusted components are located in the
upper-right corner of the consumer side. Other components of the consumer are not part of the TCB:
• Downloaded checkers (upper left corner) are only trusted if they type-check;
• Extracted checkers inherit trust from type-checked checkers.
Program extraction excluded, the TCB of Fig. 1 is exactly the TCB of Foundational PCC—a proof-checker and a
formal speciﬁcation of the program semantics and safety property. Program extraction is the price we pay for an
efﬁcient checker. This has the side-effect that the Caml compiler must also be counted among the trusted components.
In theory, moving the Caml compiler outside the TCB can be done by providing a Coq correctness proof of it, as has
been done recently for a C compiler back-end [14].
Given a program p, the code producer has to provide a machine-checkable proof that p is safe. These proofs can
be tedious and time-consuming to produce by hand. In this paper, we show how to use abstract interpretation to
construct program certiﬁcates in a fully automatic way. In this approach, programs are automatically annotated with
program properties (elements of abstract domains) together with a reconstruction strategy (to be described in detail in
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Fig. 2. Interface for certiﬁed proof checkers.
Section 5). A reconstruction strategy consists of a series of steps that allow to verify that the program properties form
a program invariant that implies the security policy.
The certiﬁed checkers implement the signature expressed by the Coq module Checker in Fig. 2. This module
ﬁrst contains a deﬁnition of the format of certiﬁcates. The function checker takes two arguments: a program P and
a candidate certiﬁcate cert generated by an untrusted external prover. If the checker function returns true, the
companion theorem checker_ok ensures that the program is safe, as deﬁned in Deﬁnition 2.1. Thus, the successful
type checking of a module against the signature Checker proves that the checker is correct.
In this paper, we propose a generic method to construct such a certiﬁed checker from a certiﬁed static analysis.
Section 3 presents the notion of certiﬁed static analysis and, as an example, develops an enhanced interval analysis for
Java byte code (Section 4). Sections 5 and 6 describe how certiﬁcate checkers can be built from certiﬁed static analyses.
We ﬁrst present an unoptimised checker and then develop techniques for ﬁxpoint compression that allow to obtain
compact program certiﬁcates. In Section 7, we then describe the implementation of a Coq functor IAChecker which
constructs a module of type Checker from any certiﬁed analysis. In Section 8, we give benchmarks of certiﬁcate
generation with the enhanced interval analysis for Java byte code.
3. A Coq signature of certiﬁed static analyses
The notion of certiﬁed analysis is based on previous work on programming a static analyser in Coq [7,22]. We recall
the main components of such a formalisation and explain how they are used for PCC.
3.1. Certiﬁed abstract interpretation for PCC
A certiﬁed analysis is a Coq function analyse ∈ Pgm → bool which for a given program p either proves the safety
of p (and returns true) or fails:
∀p ∈ Pgm, analyse(p) = true ⇒ p ⊆ Safep.
The analyser and its Coq correctness proof are built in four main steps. We stress that the following domains, functions
and relations are all Coq objects that for presentational purposes are written using ordinary mathematical notation.
(1) An abstract domain (State,,unionsq,
) with a lattice structure is introduced,  modelling the relative precision
of elements in State. In the concrete world, property precision is modelled with the partial order ⊆. The concrete
and abstract worlds are linked by a concretisation function
 : (State,,unionsq,
, ) → (P(State),⊆,∪,∩) . (1)
An abstract object s ∈ State is said to be a correct approximation of a concrete state s ∈ State if and only if
s ∈ (s). 1
(2) An abstract semantics is then speciﬁed as any post-ﬁxpoint of a well-chosen abstract functionFp ∈ State → State.
The correctness of this speciﬁcation must be proved by establishing that all post-ﬁxpoint are correct approximations
of the concrete semantics
∀p ∈ Pgm, ∀s ∈ State, F p(s)  s ⇒ p ⊆ (s). (2)
1 Because we only focus on soundness of the abstract interpreters, the classic notion of Galois connection [10] is not mandatory here. Instead we
require  to be a meet morphism, i.e. (s1 
 s2) = (s1) ∩ (s2). This is equivalent to the existence of the corresponding Galois connection when(
State,,unionsq,
,
)
is complete and 
 denotes the general greatest lower bound (on sets instead of two values).
F. Besson et al. / Theoretical Computer Science 364 (2006) 273–291 277
(3) A post-ﬁxpoint solver solve ∈ Pgm → State is then deﬁned, based on ﬁxpoint iteration techniques
∀p ∈ Pgm, F p(solve(p))  solve(p). (3)
(4) An abstract safety test Safep ∈ State → bool is deﬁned in the abstract world
∀p ∈ Pgm,∀s ∈ State, Safep(s) = true ⇒ (s) ⊆ Safep. (4)
Together, these proofs assert that Safe ◦ solve is a correct analyser.
Step (3) constructs a post-ﬁxpoint that serves as certiﬁcate for showing that the program is safe. However, for our
PCC context it is important to observe that it is only the existence of such a post-ﬁxpoint that matters for proving safety.
Formally, by combining (2) and (4) we have that
Observation 3.1. ∀p ∈ Pgm, (∃s ∈ State, F p(s)  s ∧ Safep(s) = true) ⇒ p ⊆ Safep.
In particular, this means that for a proposed certiﬁcate s ∈ State, our PCC checker only has to test Fp(s) 
s ∧ Safep(s) = true.
3.2. Certiﬁed analysis for memory invariants
We now present the Coq deﬁnition of certiﬁed analyses for languages where the semantic domain is expressed
as a set of reachable states, composed of a control point and a memory State = Ctrl × Mem. The abstract domain
State = Ctrl → Mem attaches memory invariants to each control point of a program. We will later show how to
compress such abstract states into more compact program certiﬁcates that only provide invariants at certain, well-chosen
control points. The certiﬁed analysis interface is presented in Fig. 3.
The ﬁrst element of this signature is the lattice structure AbMem which is the Coq counterpart of Mem. The Coq
lattice signature provides the standard deﬁnition of lattices (partial order, least upper bound, greatest lower bound
with their properties). The carrier of the lattice is represented by AbMem.t and the partial order by AbMem.order.
A number of lattice operations exist for designing new abstract domains. As part of our certiﬁed static analysis project,
we have developed a lattice library in Coq, containing base lattices (ﬁnite sets, intervals, …) and domain constructors
(sum, product, function) that permit to construct new abstract domains by composing these basic blocks [22]. Most of
the proofs follow standard lattice theory.
The abstract function Fp previously presented now operates on the domain
(
Ctrl → Mem) → (Ctrl → Mem).
Because the number of control points of a program is ﬁnite, say n, post-ﬁxpoints of Fp can be represented as
n-tuples (s1, . . . , s

n) ∈
(
Mem
)n
solutions to systems of constraints where a given constraint has the general form(
f (s

cp1 , . . . , s

cpk )  scp
)
. In the Coq signature, the abstract function Fp is modelled by a list of such constraints gen-
erated by the function gen_cstr. A constraint
(
f (s

cp1 , . . . , s

cpk )  scp
)
is represented by a record Constraint
with three ﬁelds: target contains the control point cp targeted by the constraint; expr computes the right-hand side
of the constraint and sources contains the list of control points which appear in the deﬁnition of f . The predicate
Verif_cstr deﬁnes what it means for an abstract state to satisfy a constraint. Finally, the predicate Approx holds
when an abstract state veriﬁes all the constraints generated from the program.
Because abstract states in State are of the form Ctrl → Mem, we can split the abstract safety test Safep into several
local tests of the form
(cp, check) ∈ Ctrl × (Mem → bool).
Each test is attached to a speciﬁc control point cp and ensures that no error state can be reached by a one-step transition
out of the state at control point cp. For example, a safety test of array bounds checks would check the value of the index
before each array access instruction of a program. The check generation is realised by a function genAbSafe which
returns, for a given program, a list of local tests.
The last element of the signature is a proof analysis_correct that states the global correctness of the constraint
generator gen_cstr and the abstract test generator gen_AbSafe. It is a direct specialisation of Observation 3.1 to
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Fig. 3. The Coq signature of a certiﬁed static analysis.
our speciﬁc abstract domain of states. If an abstract state s veriﬁes all the constraints generated by gen_constr
(i.e. is a post-ﬁxpoint of Fp) and fulﬁlls all safety checks generated by gen_AbSafe (i.e. Safep(s) = true), then the
program is safe.
4. Enhanced interval analysis for byte codes
To demonstrate the working of our PCC framework and to test its feasibility we have developed an interval analysis
for a simple byte code language. The analysis is based on existing interval analyses for high-level structured languages
[9] but has been extended with an abstract domain of syntactic expressions to obtain a similar precision at byte
code level.
4.1. Syntax and semantics
The byte code instruction set contains operators for stack and local variable manipulations and for integer arithmetic.
Instructions on arrays permit to create, obtain the size of, access and update arrays. The ﬂow of control can be modiﬁed
unconditionally (with Goto) and conditionally with the family of instructions If_icmpcond which compare the top
elements of the run-time stack and branch according to the outcome. Finally, there are instructions for inputting and
returning values. This language is sufﬁciently general to illustrate the novelties of our approach and perform experiments
on code obtained from compilation of Java source code. An extension to the object-oriented layer would follow the
lines of the certiﬁed analysis for object-oriented (Java Card) byte code already developed by Cachera et al. [7].
pgm ::= (pc instr pc)∗
instr ::= Nop | Ipush i | Pop | Dup | Ineg | Iadd | Isub | Imult
| Load x | Store x | Iinc x n
| Newarray | Arraylength | Iaload | Iastore
| Goto pc | If_icmpcond pc cond ∈ {eq, ne, lt, le, gt, ge}
| Iinput | Ireturn | Return
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Fig. 4. Operational semantics (selected rules).
The byte code language is given an operational semantics whose program states have the form 〈cp, h, s, l〉, where cp is
a control point to be executed next, h is a heap for storing allocated arrays, s is an operand stack, and l is an environment
mapping local variables to values. An array is modelled by a pair consisting of the size of the array and a function that
for a given index returns the value stored at that index. A special error state Error is used to model execution errors
which here arise from indexing an array outside its bounds:
Val = Z+ Location,
Stack = Val∗,
LocVar = Var → Val,
Array = (length : Z) × ([0, length−1] → Val),
Heap = Location → Array⊥,
State = (Ctrl × Heap × Stack × LocVar) + Error.
The operational semantics is deﬁned via a transition relation → between states in a standard fashion and will not be
explained in detail. Representative rules of the deﬁnition of → are shown in Fig. 4. They illustrate different aspects
of the byte code language; in particular, how array bound checks are performed when accessing an array. With the
introduction of a speciﬁc error state, the set of safe states can simply be deﬁned as all states except the Error state
Safep = {s | s = Error}.
4.2. Interval analysis
Interval analysis uses the set Intvl of intervals over Z = Z ∪ {−∞,+∞} to approximate integer values. The other
kind of values are the references to arrays. We abstract arrays by their size which is also represented by an interval.
The abstract domains for the analysis are deﬁned as follows:
Intvl = { [a, b] | a ∈ Z, b ∈ Z, a = −∞ ∨ ab ∨ b = +∞} ,
Num = Array = Intvl⊥,
Val = (Num + Array)⊥ ,
Stack = (Exp∗)⊥ ,
LocVar = Var → Val,
State = Ctrl → (Stack × LocVar) .
The domain of syntactic expression Exp[Val] is inductively deﬁned by the following rules:
n ∈ Z
const n ∈ Exp[Val] ,
x ∈ Var
var x ∈ Exp[Val] ,
v ∈ Val
absval v ∈ Exp[Val] ,
e ∈ Exp[Val]
−e ∈ Exp[Val] ,
e1 ∈ Exp[Val], e2 ∈ Exp[Val], op ∈ {+,−, ∗}
binop op e1 e2 ∈ Exp[Val]
.
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For each abstract domain deﬁned above we build the corresponding Coq lattice structure by simply combining lattice
functors. We use here the lattice library proposed in [22].
The novelty of this analysis is the use of an abstract domain Exp[Val] of syntactic expressions over the base abstract
domain Val of abstract values. An example of such an abstract element is binop + (var j) (const 42) which when
evaluated will result in the interval obtained by applying interval arithmetic to the interval associated with local variable
j and the constant 42. The order imposed on Exp[Val] is the order of the underlying lattice extended to expressions
by stipulating that two expressions are in the order relation if they have the same term structure and if abstract values
at all corresponding places in the term are related. The exact deﬁnition can be found in [6].
Several constraint generation rules are presented in Fig. 5 (see Appendix A for the comprehensive set of constraints).
Among these, constraints which model test-and-jump instructions are of particular interest because they make use of
the notion of backward abstract interpretation of expressions [9]. It allows to restrict the destination state of the jump
according to the information obtained by the test. When a guard of the form e1 c e2 is veriﬁed (with c a comparison
operator and e1 and e2 some expression), the current abstract environment l is reﬁned by e1 c e2test(l). The operator
 · test ∈ LocVar → LocVar over-approximates the set of environments (l, h) which fulﬁll the guard e1 c e2.
Using the abstract domain Exp[Val] of syntactic expressions over lattice Val has a signiﬁcant impact on the precision
of the analysis (and hence on the certiﬁcates that can be generated) because it allows to preserve information obtained
Fig. 5. Constraint generation rules (examples).
Fig. 6. Analysis example.
F. Besson et al. / Theoretical Computer Science 364 (2006) 273–291 281
Fig. 7. Safety test for Iaload instructions.
through the evaluation of conditional expressions. At source level, a test such as j+i>3 provides information about
the possible values of i and j that can be exploited in the branches of a conditional statement. At byte code level, this
link between variables i and j is lost (even when these corresponds to local variables in the byte code) because these
values have to be pushed onto the stack before they can be compared. Using syntactic expressions to abstract stack
content enables the analysis to keep information such as that a value is the sum of two variables. Fig. 6 provides an
example of the precision so obtained. The ﬁgure contains a Java code snippet and its compiled version in byte code,
annotated with an interval certiﬁcate. Before executing the instruction 11 : If_icmple 16, the stack contains the
abstract elements (binop + (var j) (var i)) and (const 3). Since i is the singleton interval [100,100] the analysis
can deduce that at the following instruction, j is necessarily bigger than or equal to -96.
Fig. 7 presents an example of an abstract safety test for the interval analysis. Such a test is done at each control point
where an instruction Iaload is found. We verify that the abstract operand stack has at least two elements. The ﬁrst in
an interval abstracting the index where an array element must be found and the second the interval approximating the
length of the array. We check that the index is positive and smaller than the length of the array. Here, eexpr(l) denotes
the interval resulting from the evaluation of expression e in the abstract environments l.
5. Certiﬁcate checkers
The checker component of the PCC architecture is the critical part that has to be provably sound as well as space- and
time-efﬁcient. In the following, we describe how to generate checkers and certiﬁcates that fulﬁl these requirements.
The certiﬁcates attach a piece of information to a subset of the control points. Each such piece of information can
be checked by evaluating the constraint associated with the corresponding control point. Hence, certiﬁcate size and
certiﬁcate checking are linear in the size of the program.
The method for constructing certiﬁcate checkers is generic and applies to any certiﬁed analysis. It is expressed as a
functor
Module AIChecker (CertifiedAnalysis) : Checker
which takes as argument a CertifiedAnalysis (the interface of which was deﬁned in Fig. 3) and returns a
Checker (cf. Fig. 2). Central to the construction of such a functor is Observation 3.1 which establishes the link
between the checker and the certiﬁed analysis and which provides a property that has to be proved for any new proof
checker. This property deﬁnes the notion of a ﬁxpoint checker:
Deﬁnition 5.1 (Fixpoint checker). Given a program P and a certiﬁcate cert , a ﬁxpoint checker is a function
checker : Pgm → Certiﬁcate → bool
satisfying that if checker(P, cert) = true, then there exists an abstract state s which at the same time
• approximates the program semantics (FP (s)  s) and
• respects the safety policy (SafeP (s) = true).
Observation 3.1, when combined with the property analysis_correct from the signature
CertifiedAnalysis, yields that success of a ﬁxpoint checker (checker(P, cert) = true) implies program safety.
This proves the checker_ok theorem of the Checker interface—see Theorem 5.6.
The simplest certiﬁcate to check is just an abstract state s. The algorithm of the checker for such certiﬁcates is
simple: check that all the generated veriﬁcation conditions are satisﬁed by the proposed s. Such a naive checker can
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be written as
Let checker p s =
List.for_all (verif_cstr s) (gen_cstr p) &&
List.for_all (verif_AbSafe s) (gen_AbSafe p).
This checker is directly executable because we have provided constructive deﬁnitions of the abstract domain operations
throughout the speciﬁcation. The algorithm trivially satisﬁes Deﬁnition 5.1: if the checker returns true then the
certiﬁcate s veriﬁes all the veriﬁcation conditions (those imposed by the analysis itself and those imposed by the
safety policy). In terms of complexity, this naive algorithm fulﬁls the requirement of having a runtime complexity that
is linear in the program size. For each instruction, it checks the constraints imposed by the analysis and the safety
requirements. Verifying such a constraint amounts to computing an abstract transfer function and an ordering test .
The size of the certiﬁcate is also linear in the program size—each program point stores an element of the abstract
domain. This can, however, be improved. In the following we explain how to design checkers that require signiﬁcantly
smaller certiﬁcates.
5.1. Strategies for reconstructing certiﬁcates
The naive algorithm requires certiﬁcates that provide a complete solution of the analysis: an abstract memory state is
attached to each control point. We now describe a proof checker which (implicitly) recomputes the complete solution
from a sparse certiﬁcate. The core of this checker is a reconstruction algorithm which takes as input a program and
a strategy that is interpreted step by step. Upon success, it returns a tagged abstract state from which one can extract
(after tag erasure) a correct and safe abstract state
reconstruct : Pgm → Strategy → option(Ctrl → TagMem).
The datatypes for strategy commands and tagged memories are given below:
Inductive TagMem : Set :=
| Undef
| Hint (mem:AbMem.t)
| Checked (mem:AbMem.t).
Inductive command : Set :=
| Assign (cp:Ctrl) (m:AbMem.t)
| Eval (cp:Ctrl).
Definition Strategy := list command.
Tags are used to keep track of the reconstruction status of a control point and carry the following intuitive meaning.
For a control point cp:
• Undef means that the abstract memory attached to cp has not been reconstructed yet;
• Hint mem means that mem is proposed as an (untrusted) invariant for cp;
• Checked mem means that mem satisﬁes the constraint and the safety condition associated with cp.
The reconstruction algorithm is essentially an interpreter of strategies which updates an abstract state s and at the
same time keeps track of the number chck of states that are tagged Checked. Reconstruction starts from an undeﬁned
tagged abstract state (with chck = 0) and consumes a strategy command at a time. Each command updates the current
tagged abstract state and triggers local veriﬁcation conditions.
• The command Assign cp mem explicitly provides a (presumably) sound abstract memory mem for the control
point cp. If this control point is already set (its tag is different from Undef) then the reconstruction fails. Otherwise,
if mem veriﬁes the local safety policy at control point cp, the abstract state is updated (s:=s[cp → Hint mem]).
• The command Eval cp computes the least abstract memory mem which veriﬁes the constraints imposed by the
analysis on control point cp. The behaviour changes slightly depending on the tag already attached to cp.
◦ If it is Undef and mem veriﬁes the safety condition of control point cp, then s:=s[cp → Checked mem] and
chck is incremented;
◦ If it is Hint mem’ and mem  mem’, then s:=s[cp → Checked mem’] and chck is incremented.
◦ If it is Checked mem’ then the reconstruction fails.
• If there are no more commands and the number chck of checked states equals the number of control points in s,
then reconstruction succeeds and returns Some s. Otherwise it fails.
Correctness of the reconstruction algorithm amounts to proving that if the reconstruction succeeds, it outputs a tagged
abstract state that is a correct approximation of the program and for which all control points satisfy the safety policy.
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To argue the correctness of the reconstruction, we introduce the notion of partial correctness of the tagged abstract
states at intermediate stages of the computation.
Deﬁnition 5.2. A tagged abstract state s is partially correct if every control point cp is tagged as follows:
• If a control point is tagged Checked mem then
◦ mem veriﬁes the local checks on cp imposed by the safety policy;
◦ mem veriﬁes the constraints on cp imposed by the analysis.
• If a program point is tagged Hint mem then mem only veriﬁes the local checks on cp imposed by the safety policy.
The soundness proof of the reconstruction algorithm is divided into two parts. Lemma 5.3 states that the reconstruction
algorithm only returns partially correct tagged abstract states.
Lemma 5.3 (correct reconstruction). Given program P and strategy strat , if reconstruct(P, strat) = Some s then
s is partially correct.
It can be proved (and this has been done in Coq) that each command updates the tagged abstract state such that the
invariant is preserved. The result then follows by induction on the strategy length.
Lemma 5.3 does not ensure that the reconstruction is complete: for example, the totally undeﬁned abstract state is
partially correct. However, the counter of checked state and the ﬁnal check on this counter makes it straightforward to
prove the following Lemma 5.4 which ensures that, at the end of the reconstruction, all control points have a Checked
tag attached.
Lemma 5.4 (complete reconstruction). Given program P and strategy strat . If reconstruct(P, strat) = Some s
then
∀(cp ∈ P), ∃mem, s(cp) = Checked(mem).
5.2. Optimisation of the reconstruction algorithm
The strategies presented so far explicitly yield a witness s that satisﬁes the veriﬁcation conditions of the analysis.
However, according to Observation 3.1 it sufﬁces for the checker to ensure the existence of such a witness—there is
no need to reconstruct it. This observation leads to an optimised reconstruction algorithm which exploits this weaker
requirement to drop on the ﬂy abstract memories that are no longer needed by the veriﬁcation process. This reduces
the memory usage of the reconstruction algorithm by keeping the size of the tagged abstract state as small as possible.
The strategy language is enriched with a Drop cp command and the set of memory tags is extended with a Done
value.A program point can be markedDonewhen it has been checked (i.e. its tag isChecked mem) and the computed
value is no longer needed to evaluate other constraints. In this case, the effect of the Drop cp is to set a Done tag. As
a side effect, the abstract memory mem may be garbage-collected. Lemma 5.5 formalises the correctness of strategies
with Drop commands. It says that if a strategy with Drop commands succeeds then the same strategy with all Drop
commands removed will also succeed. Since success of Drop-free strategies implies safety, this sufﬁces to ensure the
existence of the desired witness.
Lemma 5.5 (implicit reconstruction). For any strategy strat , if the reconstruction succeeds, a reconstruction using
the same strategy without Drop also succeeds.
The proof relies on the fact that Done tags can only be obtained from Checked tags. As a result, if the implicit
reconstruction drops a control point, there exists a Checked tag that would be computed by a strategy that replaces a
Drop by a no-op. By combining this intermediate result with the partial correctness (Lemma 5.3) and completeness
(Lemma 5.4) of the explicit reconstruction algorithm, we can conclude the existence of an abstract state that correctly
approximates the program and which respects the safety policy. Thus, the optimised proof checker is a ﬁxpoint checker
(cf. Deﬁnition 5.1).
Theorem 5.6 (checker). Deﬁne
checker(P, strat) ≡ (reconstruct(P, strat) = None).
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For all programs P and strategies strat ,
if checker(P, strat) = true then ∃s, F P (s)  s and SafeP (s) = true.
6. Generating certiﬁcates
The generation of strategies (a code producer task) is not safety-critical for the PCC infrastructure. However, for
our PCC scheme to be feasible, efﬁcient strategies are necessary. In this section we ﬁrst show that for any given
ﬁxpoint a strategy can be generated, and then show how these strategies can be optimised. We introduce the no-
tion of winning strategies which are strategies that verify certain well-formedness conditions with respect to the
dependencies between control points. These dependencies informally express that the abstract memory at one con-
trol point is needed for the computation of the abstract memory at another control point, and are deﬁned formally as
follows.
Deﬁnition 6.1. Let P be a program. The dependencies of a control point cp are all the control points that appear in
the rhs of a constraint with target p
Depends(cp) = {cp′ | ∃c ∈ gen_cstr(P ), c.target = cp ∧ cp′ ∈ c.sources} .
Deﬁnition 6.2. Let P be a program and s be an abstract state that is a correct abstraction of P (FP (s)  s) and
which respects the safety policy (SafeP (s) = true). A winning strategy is such that for each control point cp
(1) there exists one and only one Eval(cp);
(2) there exists at most one Assign(cp, s(cp));
(3) an Assign(cp, s(cp)) never occurs after an Eval(cp);
(4) there exists at most one Drop(cp);
(5) for all cp′ ∈ Depends(cp), we have that
(a) Eval(cp) occurs after Eval(cp′) or Assign(cp′, s(cp′));
(b) Drop(cp′) never occurs before Eval(cp′);
(c) Drop(cp′) never occurs before Eval(cp).
The essential property of winning strategies is their existence:
Lemma 6.3. For all program P and abstract state s such that FP (s)  s and SafeP (s) = true, there exists a
winning strategy strat such that
checker(P, strat) = true.
Proof. Consider the strategy made of Assign commands followed by Eval commands.
Assign(p1, s(p1)); . . . ;Assign(pn, s(pn));Eval(p1); . . . ;Eval(pn).
Conditions 1,2,3 and 5a of Deﬁnition 6.2 are trivially fulﬁlled because the control points are assigned and evaluated
once and all the assignments are made before the evaluations begin. Finally, conditions 4, 5b and 5c are vacuously true
because there are no Drop commands.
This naive strategy gives rise to the naive checker described in Section 5. It requires a whole s and evaluates all
the control points. As such, it is not a very interesting strategy. Nonetheless, its existence allows us to state the relative
completeness of our checkers. 
Theorem 6.4. Given program P and abstract state s such that FP (s)  s and Safep(s) = true, there exists a
certiﬁcate cert which ascertains Safe(P ).
Proof. Take as certiﬁcate a winning strategy which by Lemma 6.3 always exists. On such a winning strategy, the
checker succeeds. The correctness of the checker now implies that the theorem holds. 
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The generation of winning strategies can be done using the following scheme. Choose an order on the control points
and generate Eval commands for each variable in that order, issuing Assign commands when evaluation requires
the value of a variable that has not yet been visited. Drop commands can be inserted as soon as a variable is no longer
needed to evaluate those variables that have not yet been visited. By choosing different orderings, different kinds of
strategies will be generated. For example, ﬁxing to evaluate control points in increasing order leads to the lightweight
byte code veriﬁer of Rose [23]. In this kind of strategies, the Eval commands are implicit and only need to be preﬁxed
by Assign commands for each back-edge in the dependency graph. This leads to very compact strategies at the
expense of being sub-optimal in memory usage. We return to this point in Section 9 on related work.
More memory-efﬁcient strategies can be obtained by taking into account the speciﬁc topological properties of the
control-ﬂow graph (see Deﬁnition 6.1). We here list optimisations for some standard intermediate code structures:
Sequential graphs: A sequential graph is a graph for which a control point has only a single predecessor and a single
successor. Such graphs are obtained from the analysis of basic blocks. They allow a straightforward strategy which
works in constant memory and alternates a Eval command and a Drop command of the predecessor control point
Assign(p0,m0);Eval(p1);Drop(p0) . . .Eval(pn);Drop(pn−1).
Such a strategy can be coded efﬁciently by intervals of program counters.
Loop free graphs: For a directed acyclic graph (DAG), a topological traversal of the graph is a winning strategy that
does not be require a single Assign command. It is possible to further optimise this strategy by picking a traversal
that allows to insert Drop commands as early as possible. This improves the memory usage of the checker.
Reducible graphs: Reducible graphs are obtained from structured programming languages. As such, our byte code
may not be structured but any code generated from structured ones will be. For those graphs, an efﬁcient strategy consists
in placing Assign commands at loop-headers. Given these loop-headers, the rest of the graph can be decomposed
into DAGs for which the DAG strategy applies.
7. Implementation
We use the program extraction mechanism of Coq to speed up the computations both on the producer and the
consumer side. The extraction mechanism in Coq produces Caml programs from Coq terms by eliding those parts of
the terms that do not have computational content. Such parts are only necessary to ensure the well typing of the Coq
term (and thereby the correctness of the corresponding programs) but are not required for executing the programs.
Strictly speaking, nothing needs to be certiﬁed in Coq on the producer side, but parts of the extracted checker can
nonetheless be reused. In order to obtain a working analyser, the code extracted from a CertifiedAnalysis
structure must be combined with a ﬁxpoint iterator for solving the constraint systems. Such an iterator is a reusable
component independent of the speciﬁc analysis. If the extracted code does not scale well, subparts of the abstract
domains can be substituted for hand-coded operators in a modular way. This might be relevant for numeric-intensive
computations for which purely functional implementations cannot compete with the arithmetics of the processor. These
optimisations are local to the producer and serve to speed up the computation of a certiﬁcate. They may be unsafe but
can at worse lead to certiﬁcates that will not be accepted by a certiﬁed checker.
On the consumer size, the speciﬁcation of the certiﬁcate checker is a module of type Checker (presented in
Section 2). Because the ﬁxpoint reconstruction algorithm is analysis independent, certiﬁcate checkers can be constructed
in a generic fashion from any certiﬁed static analysis. This is expressed as a functor
Module AIChecker (CA:CertifiedAnalysis) : Checker.
...
Definition certificate := list command.
Definition checker (p:program) (cert:certificate) : bool :=
reconstruct (CA.gen_cstr p) (CA.gen_AbSafe p) cert <> Fail.
...
End AIChecker.
which takes as argument a CertifiedAnalysis (cf. Fig. 3) and returns a Checker, the interface of which was
deﬁned in Fig. 2.
The extracted Caml checker function must be applied to a program p and a certiﬁcate cert. Some care must be
exercised when deciding on the format of p and cert. The Coq extraction of function is correct only if the extracted
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function is evaluated on arguments that are well-typed in Coq (see Letouzey’s Ph.D. thesis [15] for a formal statement)
but the extracted Caml function will have a more permissive type and will thus return a result on arguments which
the Coq version of the function would not accept. This means that, potentially, a malicious producer could propose a
certiﬁcate that would be rejected by Coq but accepted by the Caml-type checker. The output of the extracted checker on
such a certiﬁcate is unspeciﬁed by its Coq correctness statement and would provide a security hole in the architecture.
To avoid this pitfall, we deﬁne the Coq certiﬁcate type so that it is in bijection with the corresponding extracted type.
In our implementation we choose a certiﬁcate format of form:
Definition certificate : Set := list bool.
Hence certiﬁcates are directly manipulated as lists of bits. It is the responsibility of the consumer to open and close the
stream ﬁle and convert it into a correct list of bits. The producer must then not only propose a certiﬁed checker written
in Coq but also a Coq parser to parse the bit-stream certiﬁcates. Programming such a parser is not difﬁcult since no
proof (except termination) is needed. The main Caml ﬁle of the consumer checker then has the structure
let_ =
let file = Sys.argv.(1) in
let p = Parser.parse_main (fileˆ".class") in
let s = ReadBit.get_stream (fileˆ".pcc") in
if Coq.BytecodeChecker.checker p s
then Printf.printf "program safe. \n"
else Printf.printf "bad certificate. \n".
This clearly exhibits the three components of the consumer checker:
• the byte code parser Parser.parse_main,
• the function ReadBit.get_stream to open, close and transform a channel into a list of bit,
• the extracted checker Coq.BytecodeChecker.checker.
The functionsParser.parse_main andReadBit.get_stream are part of the trusted base whereas the function
Coq.BytecodeChecker.checker, which was deﬁned above, is certiﬁed by Theorem 5.6.
8. Experiments
We have tested our PCC framework by applying the improved interval analysis described in Section 4 on a number of
array-manipulating algorithms for generating certiﬁcates for a safety policy stating that the programs do not make array
accesses that are out of bounds. The test programs have been chosen because they are all array manipulation-intensive
and hence require precise certiﬁcates in order to show that they respect this safety policy. We have generated and checked
certiﬁcates for three classical sorting algorithms (bubble sort, heap sort and quick sort), the Floyd–Warshall algorithm
for shortest past computation, and algorithms for polynomial product and vector convolution. For each algorithm,
the enhanced interval analysis described in Section 4 is sufﬁciently precise to be able to verify that all array accesses
are safe.
Figs. 8 and 9 presents some measurements pertinent to the certiﬁcation. Measures about the efﬁciency of the certiﬁcate
veriﬁcation are given in Fig. 8. The last column shows the ratio between the number of constraints that an analyser
had to evaluate to construct the certiﬁcate and the number of constraints that the checker had to evaluate. It should be
stressed that the analyser used to construct the certiﬁcates uses efﬁcient iteration algorithms based on widening and
narrowing operators to accelerate convergence. Fig. 9 shows size of various elements: source and byte code programs,
full and compress ﬁxpoints, and at last binary certiﬁcates. Compress certiﬁcates contain only one abstract memories
for each back-edge in the dependency graph. The binary certiﬁcates are obtained from the compress ﬁxpoints by an
ad hoc binary encoding. Such binary ﬁles are then decoded into strategy which follow the increasing order on program
points. Note that this encoding/decoding phase is not part of the trusted base.
Two things are worth noting here. First, the size of the certiﬁcates is much (sometimes an order of magnitude) smaller
than the code it certiﬁes. Second, the ratio between the number of evaluations of constraints used by the analyser by
far exceeds the number of evaluations used by the checker to verify the certiﬁcate—sometimes by several orders of
magnitude. The six programs are moderate in size but are sufﬁciently complex to show that the PCC infrastructure can
be used to generate compact, non-trivial program certiﬁcates which can be checked more efﬁciently than they can be
produced.
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Fig. 8. Efﬁciency experiments on various algorithms.
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9. Related work
The VeryPCC project conducted by Nipkow et al. aims at providing a foundational PCC framework veriﬁed within
the Isabelle/HOL theorem prover. Their PCC infrastructure [27] is based on a dedicated safety logic that is used to
express local program properties and the overall safety policy. The core of the framework is a generic VCGen that
generates veriﬁcation conditions in the safety logic from the program’s control ﬂow graph. The VCG is parameterised
on a weakest precondition transformer wpF that for a given instruction in the program and a given post-condition in
the safety logic ﬁnds a weakest precondition in the safety logic. This wpF transformer must be proved correct with
respect to the operational semantics of the particular programming language. One difference with the work presented
here is that the VCG works on programs annotated with loop invariants. These loop invariants can be provided by an
un-certiﬁed data ﬂow analyser but they will then have to be re-proved in Isabelle by the code producer in order to obtain
a proof that can be communicated to the code consumer. This user interaction limits the scalability of the approach as
soon as the invariants cannot be proved by the Isabelle decision procedures. Moreover, proof terms are Isabelle proof
scripts that have to be rerun. Because tactics can boil down to proof search, the efﬁciency of the proof checking is
not clear. By using an abstract interpretation certiﬁed within Coq, the analyser directly produces a proof (namely, a
post-ﬁxpoint) that can be communicated and understood by the proof checker.
The mobile resource guarantee (MRG) project [5,4] has produced a fundamental PCC infrastructure for proving
properties related to the resource consumption of a code with explicit memory management. For example, they want to
establish that a given code can avoid dynamic memory allocation by re-cycling memory that is no longer being used.
Initially, the functional source code is submitted to an advanced static analysis that will provide information about
memory consumption. This information is then used to compile into an imperative intermediate code. To reason about
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intermediate code annotated with memory consumption information, they build an intermediate layer of customised
inference rules from a generic program logic. The soundness of this logic is checked in Isabelle. Certiﬁcate checking
is now reduced to checking a proof in this dedicated logic. The MRG work shares with us the idea of installing a
dedicated proof checker that comes with its own correctness proof which can be veriﬁed with respect to an operational
semantics. The approach does not propose a particular methodology for producing such proofs but can use a variety of
type inference mechanisms. In one instantiation of the framework [17], the actual certiﬁcate checking in is done within
Isabelle using dedicated proof techniques. In contrast, we propose a particular methodology based on certiﬁed abstract
interpretation. Our use of post-ﬁxpoints and their formalisation in constructive logic allowed to obtain a proof checker
that is both certiﬁable and efﬁcient.
The open veriﬁer framework [8] is a proposal for strengthening the trust in the infrastructure without sacriﬁcing
efﬁciency. It is more ﬂexible and more secure than standard PCC. The soundness depends on a core (trusted) condition
generator. For ﬂexibility, condition generators can be installed dynamically to enrich the platform, without having
to be trusted by the core. The interaction is governed by the following protocol. The core is generating strongest
postconditions; custom components generate a weakening together with a machine-checkable proof that it is correct.
To ease the design of such custom components, a scripting language provides a ﬂexible way to describe on-the-ﬂy
abstractions. On the other hand, a foundational custom component would not have to argue its correctness at each
inference step.
Albert et al. have proposed to use abstract interpretation for automatically producing analysis-carrying code [1].
They develop a PCC framework for constraint logic programs in which a CLP abstract interpreter calculates a program
invariant (a ﬁxpoint) that is sufﬁcient to imply a given security policy. The ﬁxpoint is sent to the code consumer
who uses the abstract interpreter to check in one iteration that the certiﬁcate is a ﬁxpoint. Our work improves over
this approach in three ways. First, our FPCC approach provides transmittable proofs of correctness of our analysers
which means that they do not have to be part of the trusted computing base—this is not dealt with in [1]. Second,
the certiﬁcates in [1] are complete ﬁxpoints (the analysis answer tables) which could be further compacted with our
ﬁxpoint compression algorithm. Finally, their approach works for a high-level source code language (CLP) whereas
we have directly addressed the problem of analysing byte code.
For PCC, the size of proof terms has been a recurring problem. Several approaches have been proposed to tackle
this problem. Necula and Lee [19] enhance the LF type-checker with an efﬁcient reconstruction algorithm that allows
a more compact representation of proofs. Works closer to ours are the oracle-based checkers of Necula and Rahul [20]
who, instead of transmitting a proof term, sends as certiﬁcate an oracle (a stream of bits) that guides an higher-order
logic interpreter in his proof search. A variation of this idea has been implemented in a foundational PCC framework
by Wu et al. [28]. Unlike our approach based on certiﬁed checkers, the logic interpreters are part of the TCB. The type
of certiﬁcates are otherwise rather different but it is interesting to observe that in both cases, it is possible to generate
quite small certiﬁcates.
Lightweight bytecode veriﬁcation for the KVM developed by Rose and Rose [23,24] includes a compression scheme
for stack maps (that correspond to our certiﬁcates) based on converting a data ﬂow problem into a lightweight data
ﬂow problem. Compared to our algorithm, their stack map compression allows to evaluate certiﬁcates on the ﬂy
as constraint generation proceeds. It has the consequence that the strategy is pre-determined and ﬁxed: the con-
straints must be solved in the order they are generated. Unlike our garbage-collecting checker, their strategy for
Dropping values is hard-coded and may not be optimal. Furthermore, backward control points cannot be dropped
at all. For the same reason, the number of Assign may not be optimal. Our algorithm is more ﬂexible and ac-
commodates more efﬁcient strategies. It has also the advantage that new strategies do not require a new correctness
proof.
10. Conclusions and further work
We have developed a foundational PCC architecture based on certiﬁed static analysis. Compared to other PCC
proposals, this approach allows to employ static analyses as certiﬁcate generators in a seamless and automatic manner,
without having to re-prove proposed invariants inside a given theorem prover. The strong semantic foundations of the
theory of abstract interpretation and its recent formalisation inside the Coq proof assistant enables the construction of a
certiﬁed proof checker from the certiﬁed static analyses. Such certiﬁed proof checkers can then be installed dynamically
by a code consumer who can check the validity of the checker by type checking it in Coq.
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Instead of sending explicit representations of certiﬁcates with a mobile code, we encode certiﬁcates as strategies that
the code consumer executes in order to reconstruct a suitable post-ﬁxpoint that will imply the given security policy. Such
strategies are generated from certiﬁcates and can be further tuned to minimise memory consumption of the checker.
Indeed, proof checkers only need to verify the existence of a suitable post-ﬁxpoint, without having to re-create it in its
entirety. This is taken advantage of the garbage-collecting strategies that we have deﬁned.
The architecture has been implemented and tested with a certiﬁed interval analysis of array-manipulating byte code
in order to generate certiﬁcates attesting that a given code will not attempt to access an array outside its bounds.
The interval analysis uses a novel kind of abstract domains in which syntactic expressions are mixed with abstract
values. This symbolic representation allows to keep track of the expression used to compute a particular abstract
value—an information which is otherwise lost when compiling from high-level languages to byte code. The syntactic
expressions add just enough relational information to the otherwise non-relational interval analysis to deal properly
with the propagation of the information obtained from conditional instructions. This analysis technique should be of
interest to other analyses of low-level code.
The whole Coq development, including a working checker, is available for downloading at http://www.
irisa.fr/lande/pichardie/PCC/ .
Several issues remain open for further investigation:
• The theory of strategies for reconstruction ﬁxpoints from Section 5 could be developed further, notably with the
aim of determining general conditions for the existence of optimal strategies. Furthermore, the trade-off between the
length of a strategy (and hence its execution time) and its memory consumption should be elucidated.
• The class of security policies considered should be enlarged to include temporal policies and policies related to the
way the code consumes the resources of the host machine. Here, we have chosen to deal with the array-out-of-bounds
policy, to make the presentation focused but the framework can accommodate other policies as long as there are
certiﬁed analysers to ﬁnd the relevant information.
• We have illustrated our PCC framework with an interval-based analysis but the framework is prepared to accommodate
more precise relational analyses such as e.g., octagon-based analyses [16] as implemented in the industrial strength C
program analyser Astree [11]. An interesting, concrete illustration of how optimised and certiﬁed analysers co-exist
in our framework would be to use the highly optimised (but non-certiﬁed) abstract domains of Astree for building
certiﬁcates that would then be checked by a checker built from a certiﬁed but non-optimised octagon byte code
analyser.
Appendix A: Constraint rules for the byte code interval analysis
instr AtP (p1, Nop, p2)
m

p2  mp1
instr AtP (p1, Ipush n, p2) mp1 = (sp1 , lp1)
m

p2 
(
(const n) :: sp1 , lp1
)
instr AtP (p1,Pop, p2) mp1 = (v :: sp1 , lp1)
m

p2 
(
s

p1 , l

p1
)
instr AtP (p1,Dup, p2) mp1 = (v :: sp1 , lp1)
m

p2 
(
v :: v :: sp1 , lp1
)
instr AtP (p1, Ineg, p2) mp1 = (v :: sp1 , lp1)
m

p2 
(
(− v) :: sp1 , lp1
)
instr AtP (p1, Iadd, p2) mp1 = (v1 :: v2 :: sp1 , lp1)
m

p2 
(
(binop + v2 v1) :: sp1 , lp1
)
instr AtP (p1, Isub, p2) mp1 = (v1 :: v2 :: sp1 , lp1)
m

p2 
(
(binop − v2 v1) :: sp1 , lp1
)
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instr AtP (p1, Imult, p2) mp1 = (v1 :: v2 :: sp1 , lp1)
m

p2 
(
(binop × v2 v1) :: sp1 , lp1
)
instr AtP (p1,Load x, p2) mp1 = (sp1 , lp1)
m

p2 
(
(var x) :: sp1 , lp1
)
instr AtP (p1, Store x, p2) mp1 = (e :: sp1 , lp1) v = eexpr(lp1)
m

p2 
(
s

p1 [x → absval v], lp1 [x → v]
)
instr AtP (p1, Iinc x n, p2) mp1 = (sp1 , lp1) v = lp1(x)
m

p2 
(
s

p1 [x → absval v], lp1 [x → binop + (absval v) (const n)expr(lp1)]
)
instr AtP (p1, If _icmplt p, p2) mp1 = (e2 :: e1 :: sp1 , lp1)
m

p 
(
s

p1 , e1 < e2

test(l

p1)
)
instr AtP (p1, If _icmplt p, p2) mp1 = (e2 :: e1 :: sp1 , lp1)
m

p2 
(
s

p1 , e1e2

test(l

p1)
)
instr AtP (p1,Newarray, p2) mp1 = (e :: sp1 , lp1)
m

p 
(
(absval eexpr(l

p1)) :: sp1 , lp1
)
instr AtP (p1,Arraylength, p2) mp1 = (v :: sp1 , lp1)
m

p 
(
v :: sp1 , lp1
)
instr AtP (p1, Iaload, p2) mp1 = (v1 :: v2 :: sp1 , lp1)
m

p 
(
 :: sp1 , lp1
)
instr AtP (p1, Iastore, p2) mp1 = (v1 :: v2 :: v3 :: sp1 , lp1)
m

p 
(
s

p1 , l

p1
)
instr AtP (p1,Goto p, p2)
m

p  mp1
instr AtP (p1, Iinput p, p2) mp1 = (sp1 , lp1)
m

p2  ( :: sp1 , lp1)
l[x → v] denotes the abstract local variables where value of variable x has been updated to v. s[x → v] denotes
the stack of expressions where all occurrences of (var x) has been replaced by v.
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